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INTRODUCTION 
This Court issued its Opinion in this matter on November 21, 
1994• The Court determined that Defendant/Appellant (hereafter 
"Gurley") filed a timely Notice of Appeal and vacated the trial 
court's judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff/Appellee 
(hereafter "Nielson") had failed to file timely notices of claim 
with appropriate governmental entities, thereby depriving the 
trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Nielson filed a Petition For Rehearing on December 12, 1994. 
The Court of Appeals requested by letter of December 20, 1994 
that Gurley respond only to the first three of four issues raised 
by Nielson's Petition. As set forth in Nielson's Petition, these 
issues are: 
1. Portions of the record not transmitted 
to this Court establish that Notice of 
Claim was mailed to the Attorney General 
on August 14, 1991, thus complying with 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
2. Provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act "excepting" claims against 
a state employee based on fraud or 
malice from its provisions were 
overlooked. 
3. Utah law exempting equitable claims from 
the requirement of Notice of Claim 
pursuant to the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act was overlooked or 
misapprehended. 
Petition, p. iii. 
In the following Response Gurley addresses each of these 
three issues. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A complete statement of the facts as they relate to this 
case generally and as they relate to the specific issue of 
Nielson,s failure to file a notice of claim pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act is set forth in the Brief of Appellant, 
pp. 8-12. However, a review of the critical dates is 
appropriate: 
1. On September 8, 1990, Gurley, a peace officer employed 
by the Division of Wildlife Resources, disabled and seized a 
portion of a device used to trap birds. (Trial Exhibit 14; R. 
215-216; Appellant's Addendum at 516-519) 
2. On September 18, 1990, Nielson, a licensed Utah 
attorney representing himself, filed legal action in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County, civil number 
90-030-0302 (hereafter "First Action"). The First Action named 
Gurley as the sole defendant and sought money damages for 
"conversion"f "interference with contract" and "defamation". 
(Complaint, R. 22; Appellant's Addendum at 453) 
3. Prior to filing the First Action, Nielson did not file 
a Notice of Claim with the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources 
and/or with the Utah Attorney General7s Office as required by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
4. On August 14, 1991, Nielson filed a Motion for Leave to 
File Amended Complaint, together with a proposed Amended 
Complaint in the First Action. This proposed Amended Complaint 
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was served by mail on John A. Soltis# Esq., who, at the time, was 
counsel of record for Gurley. 
5. The proposed Amended Complaint, together with its 
August 14, 1991 certificate of mailing, were included in the 
original Record before this Court (R. 329-341) and in the 
Appellants Addendum at 427-439. It is the service-by mail on 
Mr. Soltis of the proposed Amended Complaint which appellee now 
claims constitutes notice to the Attorney General of the State of 
Utah of Nielson's intent to file another lawsuit. 
6. On September 9, 1991, plaintiff filed a second legal 
action in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele 
County, civil number 91-030-0249 (R. 2087; hereafter "Second 
Action"). The Complaint in the Second Action is virtually 
identical to the Amended Complaint which Nielson sought leave to 
file in the First Action. 
7. On December 30, 1991, plaintiff filed an Amended 
Complaint in the Second Action. (R. 2214) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
NIELSON DID NOT FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM WITH 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH PRIOR 
TO INITIATING LEGAL ACTION AGAINST GURLEY 
Nielson argues that this Court should entertain a rehearing 
on the notice of claim issue because the record on appeal did not 
include the mailing certificate that he claims to prove service 
of a "notice of claim" on the Attorney General. A copy of 
Nielson's letter to the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals and 
-* 
the mailing certificate which he refers to in this letter are 
attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Not surprisingly, Nielson never 
indicates what the mailing certificate is attached to. In fact, 
it is the certificate of service of the proposed Amended 
Complaint, which Nielson filed in the First Action and which was 
served on John Soltis in his capacity as counsel of record for 
Gurley in the First Action. Clearly, it was not intended to be 
and cannot legally constitute a notice of claim under the 
Governmental Immunity Act filed with the Attorney General. 
Moreover, Nielson's representation that the mailing 
certificate was not a part of the record on appeal is false. The 
proposed Amended Complaint was part of the initial record of 
appeal and can be found at 329-341, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 2. Additionally, the proposed Amended 
Complaint was part of the Appellant's Addendum submitted to this 
Court with the Brief of Appellant (Appellant's Addendum at 427-
439). Thus, Nielson's argument that the Court failed to consider 
evidence because the record was not before it is patently 
wrong. ~; 
Nielson admits that he did not file a notice of claim prior 
to initiating his First Action on September 18, 1990. As this 
Court has already ruled, the failure of Nielson to precede the 
^Apparently, the district court clerk had Bates stamped, but 
not forwarded, the pleadings in the Second Action to the Court of 
Appeals. However, although the proposed Amended Complaint was 
attached as an exhibit to Nielson's Complaint filed in the Second 
Action, it was also, obviously, part of the record in the First 
Action, which was available to the Court at the time it decided 
the appeal. 
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f i l i n g of t h e F i r s t Action with 4*V|~ * n 
w i t h both t h e D i v i s i o n of Wild.I ft- Resources and * f< A t t o r n 
Genet a I of I III lit,alt Il III • Ill Il >pi ibiert" m a t t e r 
jurisdiction, 
In his Petition for Rehearinq, Nielson argues that when he 
f i l e d a p r o p o s e d is inn in 11 III i«i III i (iiiiiif n III m i l i n I III Il in i 1 Ai I i n n i 
a copy of it to counsel of record tor Gurley, it became notice to 
the A"ornev Genera] that Ni el son intended to fi ] e another 
Second Action against Gurley by filing a Complaint on 
Sep 1 99] , he had complied with the notice provision of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.--''1' 
Utah Code Ann, *i 63-30-11 ( J) (b) clearly provides that a 
r ill I 1 in directed and delivered In the 
responsible governmental entity accordinq to the requirements of 
§ S3-:- - * -30-13" (emphasis added). Clearly, Nielsen's 
pi i - * 11111II ' III in t f i 11 ni11 in in III ' ilh III mi veil ecil1111 
-
yEven if the service of the Amended Complaint could have the 
legal effect that Nielson argues it should, the Court:, would, sti 11 
lack subject matter jurisdiction because Nielson's Second Action 
was commenced on September 9, 1991 when he filed it with the 
Third District Court. Rule 3(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. He failed to allow ninety days from service of the 
proposed Amended Complaint in the First Action on August 14, 1991 
before instituting the Second Action. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 
provides that a governmental entity has ninety days to act upon a 
notice of claim. If the governmental entity fails to respond to 
the claimant within the ninety days, the claim is deemed denied. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 clearly states that a claimant may 
institute an action in the district court against a governmen 
entity or an employee of the entity only wif the claim is 
denied". Thus, even under Nielson's tortured scenario, his 
Second Action was instituted prematurely, once again depriving 
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
the Attorney General of the State of Utah as required by 
S 63-30-12, which requires that a claim against the State of Utah 
or one of its employees be "filed with the Attorney General and 
the agency concerned". The only place that the proposed Amended 
Complaint was filed was with the Third District Court. The only 
other place it was delivered or directed was to Gurley's lawyer. 
It was never directed or delivered as a notice of claim to the 
Attorney General. 
Nielson's attempt to bootstrap a pleading entitled "Amended 
Complaint" and served on counsel of record in the First Action 
into a formal notice of claim served upon the Attorney General of 
the State of Utah is absurd. Mr. Soltis, a lawyer employed by 
the Utah Attorney General, was representing Gurley in the First 
Action because the conduct which Nielson assailed was performed 
by Gurley in his capacity as a peace officer for the State of 
Utah. Neither the State of Utah nor the Attorney General were 
parties to the legal action and Mr. Soltis could not, by 
definition, have been representing either of them in the lawsuit. 
He was operating solely as the attorney for Gurley in defending 
Nielson's legal action against him. 
Additionally, nowhere does Nielson attempt to, nor can he, 
explain what the proposed Amended Complaint purports to be notice 
of. Nowhere in the proposed Amended Complaint does Nielson state 
that he intends to file another separate lawsuit to mimic the 
allegations set forth in the proposed Amended Complaint. The 
only thing the proposed Amended Complaint is notice of is that 
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Nielson war, a Amended Complaint 
The (inly person pla* no t i ce of t h i s J * •> 
c 1 i M n a t t e r UL idw/ <& 
proposed Amended Complaint const 1 l u t e s s e r v i c e on t h e p a r t y , Dale 
Gurley, moll 1 lie employer ol Mi i iiiiiii I i pl * counsel of record •-' 
I I 1 C I S i I l l • - I 1 l . ) III III! I l l II IIIIIII I M F I I H I " t II II ( W l l p l I I I I II II ' i ' II i III I . " C t I I I 
notice of claim provision ni the Utah Governmental Immunity A*. I . 
He cites no precedent for H I P legal proposition that the mailing 
cert J f icdie J M achetf ' ,
 k , n <«  I J», pinJed ( i 'U|»IM , ' 
action fulfills the notice of claim i (jquirement of the 
Covornmental Immunity Act for filing another lawsuit Of coutse, 
i u mi I low such legal tr :ii • sker i I 11 ". nice t<<-»c i wi inii I Il n -ma < mi I ,-t I n II, h e 
n o t i c e o f c l a i m r e q u i r e m e n t , I'I lil.iqnnl eoulii ?-;nipJy f i l e a 
I .riwfuiii i I Willi ill pi ci e d i n<| n o t i o n ol c l a i m a n d , t h r e e m o n t h s 
later, file another lawsuit claiming that the iii, n idwsu 
notice for the second. This Court should pay no limed In 
11 1 # i o u n ' i. m i 'i. l i e i iii i i" in mi in mi I i in v i 111 HIS til q u m i ' n t 
NIELSON'S PRAYER INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
DOES NOT EXCUSE HIM FROM COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT NOTICE REQUIREMENTS 
As an iiiternatj ve basis for '. Petiti , Nielson 
halfheartedly argues that the except * ;overnmental immunity 
II I III C t , | ! l It l »II I I II 
-'Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of civil Procedure provides that 
"whenever under these rules service is required or permitted ~~ 
be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service 
shall be made upon the attorney unless servi ce upon the party 
himself is ordered by the Court." 
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notice requirements. Apparently, his argument is that by 
amending the Complaint in the Second Action in December 1991 to 
add a prayer for injunctive relief, he turned the case into an 
action in equity and thereby removed the entire consolidated 
lawsuit from the purview of the Governmental Immunity Act. The 
folly of Nielson's argument is apparent. 
In support of his argument, Nielson cites only American 
Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992). 
In American Tierra, the Utah Supreme Court recognized only that 
claims for the recovery of taxes or unlawful levies are equitable 
in nature and, consequently, not subject to the notice 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. The case is 
inapposite because the present lawsuit is plainly not equitable 
in nature. In fact, the original Complaint filed by Nielson on 
September 18, 1990 in the First Action set forth only tort claims 
for ,fconversionff, "tortious interference with contract" and 
"defamation." (R. 0022) His prayer for relief requested only 
money damages. Id. 
On August 14, 1991, after the Court granted his Motion For 
Summary Judgment, Nielson moved to amend his Complaint in the 
First Action. Along with his Motion To Amend, he filed his 
proposed Amended Complaint, which again set forth claims for 
conversion, tortious interference with contract, and defamation 
and prayed for money damages. (R. 0341) Nielson added a prayer 
for injunctive relief, essentially requesting that the Court 
order Gurley not to engage in tortious conduct in the future. 
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Id. Nielson's Amended Complaint in the Second Action is 
identical in its claims and prayer for relief. (R. 2230) 
Nielson's three tort claims, whether in the First Action or the 
Second Action, are clearly not equitable in nature. The fact 
that he added an incidental prayer for "injunctive relief" based 
on those claims does not change the fundamental nature of the 
lawsuit and cannot magically cure its preexisting jurisdictional 
defects. See El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City, 565 
P.2d 778, 780 (Utah 1977). 
If one were to accept Nielson's argument, plaintiffs could 
in every instance circumvent the Governmental Immunity Act by 
simply adding a prayer for "injunctive relief" even where, as 
here, all the causes of action are common law tort claims for 
money damages. The Act would be meaningless. Clearly, such a 
result is not intended by our legislature or courts. 
This lawsuit is plainly legal in nature. Nielson's argument 
that equitable claims are not subject to the notice requirements 
of the Governmental Immunity Act is without merit and does not 
warrant rehearing of the appeal. Moreover, this argument is not 
new. Nielson made the same argument before and this Court 
properly rejected it. 
III. 
THIS COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND REJECTED 
NIELSON'S ARGUMENT THAT ALLEGATIONS OF MALICE 
EXEMPT HIS CLAIMS FROM THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
This issue has already been thoroughly briefed and correctly 
ruled upon by this Court. Unhappy with the result, Nielson 
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continues to assert his unsuccessful argument that the scope of 
the notice requirement is co-extensive with the substantive 
sovereign immunity provision of the Act. 
Nielson, once again, confuses the provision of the 
Governmental Immunity Act that provides for personal liability of 
an employee who acts with fraud or malice (§ 63-30-4(3)) with 
separate provisions of the Act requiring delivery of notices of 
claim. This Court correctly holds that the issues of immunity 
from personal liability and the requirement for filing a notice 
of claim under the Act are not co-extensive. See Slip Opinion, 
p. 9. This Court's holding on this issue is clearly correct and 
there is no reason to revisit it. 
In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 (Utah 
1988)(Borthick II), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the very 
statutory language in effect at the time Nielson commenced this 
action and noted that the language expressly required "service of 
notice of claim on the State in all suits against employees, 
whether or not any judgment might be ultimately payable by the 
State". 769 P.2d at 252 and n. 11. The determining factors for 
the notice requirement are not whether malice or fraud are 
alleged, but whether the underlying acts were "under color of 
authority." This Court has properly recognized that Borthick II 
disposes of Nielson7s malice argument in Gurley's favor. 
Furthermore, as Gurley explained in his Reply Brief, 
Yearsely v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990), implicitly 
recognizes that allegations of malice do not suffice to 
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circumvent the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. There a plaintiff was not permitted to add claims based on 
malice where she had failed previously to provide prior, proper 
notice of her initial claims, 
Nielson's repeated citation to cases for the proposition 
that immunity is waived for claims of fraud or malice can only be 
designed to mislead the Court. As the Court properly recognized, 
the scope of the notice requirement is distinct and broader than 
the scope of governmental immunity. This is the only 
interpretation of the Act which makes sense and the only 
interpretation supported by the case law. Nielson has failed to 
cite a single case in which notice was not required because 
claims against a government employee were based on malice or 
fraud. The Court's ruling on this issue is correct and should 
not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
Nielson's argument that portions of the record were not 
transmitted and therefore prevented this Court from considering 
his mailing certificate is inaccurate. The certificate of 
mailing that Nielson proposes to constitute service of a notice 
of claim on the Attorney General was a part of the record 
transmitted to this Court and available at the time it considered 
the merits of the appeal. Moreover, the record clearly 
establishes that the pleading to which the mailing certificate 
was attached was not and cannot constitute a notice of claim 
delivered to the Attorney General. It was attached to a proposed 
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Amended Complaint filed in the First Action and was simply served 
on Gurley's counsel of record. It was never intended as a notice 
of claim; neither could it be considered a notice of claim 
regardless of its intent. Moreover, it was never "delivered11 to 
the Attorney General of the State of Utah. 
Nielson's argument that notice was not required because his 
claims are equitable in nature is one that has already been 
argued and dismissed by this Court. Furthermore, the record 
establishes that Nielson's claims are not equitable in nature. 
They are and always have been legal claims arising out of alleged 
common law torts. 
Similarly, Nielson's final argument that he need only allege 
malice and fraud to avoid the notice requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act has appropriately been rejected by this 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court. 
Nielson's desperate arguments all attempt to circumvent the 
clear meaning and legislative intent of the notice of claim 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. One must 
presume that Nielson, himself an attorney, made a calculated 
decision not to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Indeed, the theme of his appellate arguments has been that he 
doesn't have to comply because Gurley was outside the scope of 
his employment as a peace officer. The holding of this Court 
that Gurley was acting under color of authority and that proper 
notices of claim had to be filed at least ninety days before 
instituting legal action is correct and cannot be assailed. 
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Because he was acting under color of authority, Nielson was 
required to comply with the notice of claim provisions of the 
Act. He did not. Nielson7s Petition for Rehearing must be 
denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of January, 1995. 
,IAMS & HUNT 
By 
DENNIS C. FERGUSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of January, 1995, I 
caused a true and correct copy of ANSWER OF APPELLANT TO 
APPELLEES PETITION FOR REHEARING to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Daniel D. Darger 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Parker M. Nielson 
655 South 200 East 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UtcrfT\ 84111 
By 
j 
XAAA . A DENNIS C. FERGUSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Parker M. Nielson Attorney at Law (P.C.) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-1150 
December 8, 1994 
Marilyn N. Branch, Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
RE: Nielson v. Gurley, No. 930327-CA 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
When we went to your office to check the record in the 
above-entitled case, with reference to Judge Orme's opinion 
indicating that there was no evidence in the record of our having 
filed a notice with the Attorney General, we found that you did 
not have the entire record. This matter involves two 
consolidated appeals; case no. 910300249 with no. 900300302. The 
record on file includes only the portion relating to the 3 02 case 
and does not contain the record concerning the 249 case. 
We subsequently checked with the Clerk of the Court in Tooele 
and discovered that the record concerning the 249 case is still 
lodged with the District Court. It is properly paginated and 
indexed for transmission to the Court of Appeals, but for some 
unknown reason has never been transmitted. The proof of service 
that Judge Orme was unable to find appears at Record p. 2202 of 
the 249 file. 
I have suggested that the Clerk of the Court in Tooele 
transmit the record to you. If there is any need to do so, you 
should also request that portion of the record so that it will be 
available when we file our Petition for Rehearing. 
Your cooperation in this regard is appreciated. 
Very truly yours, 
barker M. Nielson 
PMN:lh(0668N) 
cc: Clerk of the Court, Tooele 
Dennis Ferguson, Esq. 
Jody K. Burnett, Esq. 
to Plaintiff's character and reputation-
s' For costs of this action, including a reasonable amount 
for attorneys' fees; and 
F. For such further and additional relief as the Court 
determines proper. 
DATED this/2^1 day of August, 1991. 
/Parker M. Nielson 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this *'-_ ''day of August, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the above and foreqoing AMENDED COMPLAINT 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. John P. Soltis, Assistant 
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
/ 
(0289N) 
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EXHIBIT 2 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
DALE GURLEY, 
Defendant. ] 
i AMENDED COMPLAINT 
i (Jury Demanded) 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Civil No. 900 300 302 
Leave of the Court being first had and obtained, Plaintiff 
complains of Defendant and alleges as follows (Exhibits, other 
than the letter referred to in paragraph 30, are omitted to avoid 
redundancy, as to which see the Verified Complaint herein): 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant is a resident of Payson, Utah County, State of 
Utah. 
3. The incidents complained of occurred in Tooele County, 
State of Utah, and involve a sum or value in excess of $10,000. 
PERTINENT FACTS 
4. Plaintiff has property rights, in common with Messrs. 
Leslie Foote and Roy N. Byrd, by virtue of Special Use Lease 
Agreement No. 798 with the State of Utah, Division of State Lands 
and Forestry, in the following lands situated in Tooele County, 
3RD DISTRICT COURT-TDQELE 
9! AUG 15 ?n 2^  33 
FILED BY SL 
State of Utah: 
Township 9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M 
Section 15: SW4, W2SE4 
Section 16: SE4 
Section 22: N2NW4 
Said lease, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and 
incorporated herein by reference, is for the specific purpose of 
"releasing and propagating gamebirds for hunting dog training and 
conducting non-commercial competition of hunting dogs." 
5. The lessees as to said Lease No. 798, acting by and through 
Leslie Foote, applied to the State of Utah, Department of Natural 
Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources, for and were issued a 
Certificate of Registration for a Private Wildlife Farm at T.9S., 
R.6W., SLB&M, Sec. 15, 16, 22, Tooele Co., which is inclusive of 
the lands embraced by Lease No. 798. Said Certificate of Registra-
tion, No. PWF-SLO-129, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B and 
incorporated herein by reference, was pursuant to an application, a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit C and incorporated herein by 
reference, for the purpose of "dog training and incidental 
propagation." 
6. The State of Utah, Division of Wildlife Resources, has 
issued a "Proclamation for the Possession of Live Game Birds," a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D and incorporated 
herein by reference, provisions of which are controlling as to 
persons, including those holding a Certificate of Registration for 
a Private Wildlife Farm or otherwise possessing live game birds. 
Said proclamation contains the following provisions pertinent to 
this Complaint: 
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(a) A "private wildlife farm" is defined as 
"[a]n enclosed place such as, but not limited to, 
a pen or aviary, where privately owned game birds 
are propagated or kept and which enclosure 
restricts the birds from escaping into the wild," 
(Emphasis added.) 
(b) "A certificate of registration IS NOT 
required for a person to acquire live game birds 
for the purpose of training dogs . . . provided 
the birds are banded, are not held for more than 
60 days, and a bill of sale from a legal source 
is in possession." (Emphasis in original.) 
(c) "Any peace officer or special function 
officer may request persons engaged in activities 
covered under these rules to exhibit any 
documentation related to such activities 
(including, but not limited to, certificate of 
registration, permit, health certificate, bill of 
sale, proof of ownership), any game birds, and 
any device, apparatus and facility used for 
activities covered under these rules." 
7. The Wildlife Resources Code of Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 
23-13-14, and the Proclamation for the Possession of Live Game 
Birds, R608-4-3, provide that "live game birds may not be released 
or abandoned without first obtaining written authorization from 
the Director of the [Wildlife Resources] Division." 
8. Various provisions of The Wildlife Resources Code of Utah, 
including Utah Code Ann. § 23-17-2, permit, inter alia, persons 
legally possessing live game birds to restrict them and prevent 
their release or abandonment, as they are required to do by said 
provisions alleged in the preceding paragraph, by "taking" or 
"trapping," including by recall pens, "any birds . . . held in 
private ownership legally acquired." The process of recalling, or 
trapping, birds in private ownership but which may be temporarily 
out of a holding pen also constitutes the maintenance, control and 
constructive possession of and over domestic game birds acquired 
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from a legal source. 
9. Said proclamation for Taking of Upland Game was adopted by 
the State of Utah Wildlife Board providing, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
DAMAGE OF PROPERTY . . . [I]t is unlawful 
for any person, without the consent of the 
owner or person in charge of any privately 
owned land, to tear down, mutilate or destroy 
any . . . fence or other enclosure on this 
privately owned land . . . . 
Said provision is identical with Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-15. 
CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF 
10. On September 7, 1990, Plaintiff purchased four (4) live 
Chukar Partridge from a licensed game farm in Tooele County. A 
copy of the bill of sale as to said Chukar is attached hereto as 
Exhibit E. 
11. Also on September 7, 1990, Plaintiff took said Chukar to 
a locked and secure pen outfitted or equipped with devices, known 
as "recall cones," for maintaining possession and control over 
privately owned game birds outside of, but in near proximity to, 
the pen. Said pen was on the premises leased to Plaintiff under 
said Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798. Plaintiff supplied the 
Chukar with feed and water, and left them there for safekeeping. 
12. Plaintiff maintained and had in his possession at said 
pen a supply of bands, furnished by and purchased from the 
Division of Wildlife Resources, State of Utah, for use in banding 
live game birds if and when used for dog training, in accordance 
with the foregoing proclamation. 
13. In the early morning of September 8, 1990, Plaintiff went 
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to the premises described by said Special Use Lease Agreement No. 
798 and took three (3) of the live birds in the pen and used them, 
immediately, for hunting dog training in accordance with said 
Proclamation for the Possession of Live Game Birds. The fourth 
bird was left in the pen, for the purpose of maintaining 
constructive possession and control over those used for training 
by means of said recall cones or devices and by taking advantage 
of their natural "covey instinct." 
14. During the entire time alleged, Plaintiff had in his 
possession copies of Certificate of Registration No. PWF-SL0-129 
and a bill of sale documenting the purchase of four (4) live game 
birds from a lawful source. 
15. After several hours of hunting dog training, and 
replenishing the water in a float-fed water device near the bird 
pen, Plaintiff drove near enough to a pickup truck and two men who 
had been observed watching Plaintiff's activities for 
approximately one-half hour to verify that they were engaged in no 
mischief, and then left the leased premises at about 10:00 a.m. 
CONDUCT OF DEFENDANT 
16. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such 
information and belief alleges, that one of the two men seen 
observing Plaintiff from said pickup truck was Defendant, Dale 
Gurley ("Gurley" herein). 
17. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on such 
information and belief alleges, that Gurley had been observing the 
activities of Plaintiff for a period of hours, from an oak covered 
area on the ridge between North Oak Brush and North Pine Canyons, 
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a distance of about one mile southerly from said pen. Plaintiff 
is further informed and believes, and on such information and 
belief alleges, that Gurley had, from time to time for a period of 
weeks prior to September 8, 1990, from motor vehicles and from 
vantage points where he attempted to conceal himself, observed 
Plaintiff going and coming to said premises to care for domestic 
game birds maintained by Plaintiff thereon and engaging in hunting 
dog training. 
18. Gurley did not, at any time during the period of his 
observations of Plaintiff, request Plaintiff to exhibit any 
documentation, including any certificate of registration, permit, 
bill of sale or proof of ownership of any game birds or any 
device, apparatus and facility used or related to such activities, 
although Gurley could easily have done so over a period of weeks 
and was in near proximity to and within voice range of Plaintiff 
for at least one-half hour. 
19. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on such 
information and belief alleges, that Gurley did tear down, 
mutilate or destroy the fence or other enclosure represented by 
the bird pen and bird house, in disregard of Plaintiff's rights 
thereto and in disregard of the laws of the State of Utah and 
proclamations of the Wildlife Board alleged herein. 
20. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on such 
information and belief alleges, that Gurley destroyed, or 
converted to his own use, the following described personal 
property of Plaintiff located in or in conjunction with said bird 
pen: 
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Approximately fifteen (15) bands for marking game 
birds, two (2) game bird feeders, one bag of game 
bird feed and one plastic container containing 
game bird feed, two (2) game bird watering 
devices, one float control for livestock watering 
and related hoses and fixtures for watering 
wildlife (not limited to game birds) and domestic 
birds and at least one live game bird (Chukar 
Partridge) together with at least six (6) other 
game birds (Chukar Partridge) which were under 
Plaintiffs constructive possession and control 
by virtue of said game farm facilities and 
equipment but which are now lost by reason of the 
removal of said "call" bird. 
21. Gurley then went to the Silver Sage Store, located in 
Vernon, several miles from Plaintiff's leased property, and 
maintained surveillance on a camper in which Plaintiff was staying 
for a period of hours, but never approached Plaintiff at any time 
to request the display of any permits, bill of sale or other 
evidence of the regularity of Plaintiff's possession of live game 
birds or other activities of Plaintiff alleged. During the course 
of Gurley7s surveillance of Plaintiff, and in the presence of 
other persons known to and personal friends, professional and 
business clients, and acquaintances of Plaintiff, Gurley falsely 
stated in a telephone conversation from the Silver Sage Store that 
Plaintiff was engaged in violations of the law, but never 
confronted Plaintiff with his charges. 
22. From time to time over a period of years prior to 
September 8, 1990, commencing on or about December 30, 1986, 
Gurley has made public statements to the effect that he would 
interfere with and prevent Plaintiff's conduct of hunting dog 
training near Vernon by causing Plaintiff to be cited, arrested or 
prosecuted over matters which he, Gurley, would initiate or cause 
to be initiated. 
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23. The conduct of Gurley alleged was performed with actual 
malice towards Plaintiff, including for the reasons alleged in the 
next preceding paragraph. 
DAMAGES 
24. The personal property alleged herein to have been de-
stroyed or converted to the use of Gurley has a reasonable value of 
in excess of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) 
25. The conduct of Gurley amounts to interference with con-
tract rights of Plaintiff, including rights under said Lease No. 
798 and Certificate of Registration No. PWF-SLO-129, which have no 
commercial value but significant and unique value to Plaintiff, and 
the actual amount of which is difficult to appraise, but are 
believed by Plaintiff to have a fair and reasonable value of 
approximately $10,000.00. 
26. The conduct of Gurley has resulted in actual damage to 
Plaintiff's character and reputation, including his character as 
an attorney at law, and with the Division of Wildlife Resources as 
a law abiding person, in the sum or value of $50,000.00. 
GROUNDS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF 
27. Gurley's conduct will, unless restrained or enjoined, 
result in immediate and irreparable injury to Plaintiff for which 
there is no adequate remedy at law, for which money damages are 
inadequate, including because Plaintiff will be prevented from 
exercising the rights contracted for with the State of Utah in 
Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 and will be prevented, both 
directly and through his partner and co-lessee, Leslie Foote, from 
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exercising the rights under Certificate of Registration No. 
PWF-SLO-129, all of which are of unique value and which cannot be 
valued or compensated for in a money judgment or a judgment at law. 
28. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such 
information and belief alleges, that Gurley has falsely stated to 
employees and officers of the Forest Service of the United States 
that Plaintiff is illegally trapping wild game birds and otherwise 
conducting illegal activities, and such conduct will, unless 
restrained or enjoined, constitute further immediate and 
irreparable injury to Plaintiff as follows: 
A. Said conduct by Gurley was for the purpose or will 
have the necessary effect of defaming Plaintiff and interfering 
with Plaintiff's relationship with the dominant landowner in the 
areas of Plaintiff's lease and raises the possibility that, unless 
restrained or enjoined, Plaintiff's rights under said lease and 
said Certificate of Registration will be further impaired. 
B. Said conduct of Gurley is further wrongful for the 
reason that Plaintiff has enjoyed a high reputation and friendly 
association with the Forest Service, including because Plaintiff 
was formerly an Assistant United States Attorney having 
responsibility for trial of legal disputes involving the Forest 
Service. Gurley's conduct, unless restrained or enjoined, will 
result in injury to Plaintiff's reputation and association with 
the Forest Service for which there is no speedy or effective 
remedy at law. 
C. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on 
such information and belief alleges, that officers, agents and 
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employees of the Forest Service to whom Gurley has made his false 
accusations include the following: Thomas L. Tidwell, District 
Ranger; Dave Griffel, Forest Officer; Ms. Marlene Depietro, 
Supervisory Range Conservationist; and Jay Best, Forest Service 
Contractor. 
29. The wrongfulness of Gurley's accusations regarding 
Plaintiff is an adjudicated fact by virtue of the Partial Summary 
Judgment entered by the Honorable David S. Young herein on June 
24, 1991. 
30. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on such 
information and belief alleges, that the need for injunctive 
relief is evident in that Gurley has continued his unlawful 
activities, in defiance and contempt of the orders of Judge Young, 
including by causing the Director of the Wildlife Resources 
Division, Department of Natural Resources, State of Utah, to 
direct a letter dated July 8, 1991, to Plaintiff and various 
associates of Plaintiff, purporting to restrict or limit dog 
training activities in the area of Plaintiff's lease. The 
purpose, or one of the purposes of said letter was to impose 
limits on Plaintiff's leasehold rights and dog training activities 
in disregard of Judge Young's Judgment declaring such limits 
improper, without probable cause and unlawful and Plaintiff is 
therefore informed and believes, and on information and belief 
alleges that unless restrained and enjoined Gurley and agents of 
DWR, acting in concert with participation with Gurley, will 
continue to disregard the orders of this Court. A copy of said 
letter is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
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31. Said conduct by Gurley, either individually or in 
conjunction with the Director, is further wrongful because it 
exceeds their statutory authority under Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-17-8, 
23-14-18(4) and 23-14-8, which vest authority for establishing 
wildlife conservation rules in the Wildlife Board and limit 
administrative and law enforcement personnel of the Division of 
Wildlife Resources to execution of the policies of the Wildlife 
Board, and under resolutions of the Wildlife Board repealing 
former proclamations limiting dog training and dog trials during 
the nesting season, thereby permitting dog trials in the State of 
Utah at any time, including during the nesting season, other than 
in designated wildlife preserves. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Conversion) 
32. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
31. 
33. The conduct of Gurley alleged constitutes conversion of 
property belonging to Plaintiff. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Tortious Interference with Contract Rights) 
34. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
31. 
35. The conduct of Gurley alleged constitutes the tortious 
interference with Plaintiff's contract rights with the State of 
Utah under said Lease No. 798 and Certificate of Registration No. 
PWF-SLO-129. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Defamation) 
36. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
31. 
37. The conduct of Gurley alleged has injured the character 
and reputation of Plaintiff, including Plaintiff's character and 
reputation in the practice of law, and with the Division of Wild-
life Resources, public prosecutors and the office of the Attorney 
General, State of Utah, and amounts to slander and/or libel of 
Plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendant as 
follows: 
A. Enjoining Defendant, or any persons acting as agents of 
Defendant or in concert or participation with Defendant, from 
interfering, directly or indirectly, with Plaintiff's rights under 
his lease with the State of Utah or the rights of Plaintiff or 
Plaintiff's partners and affiliates under their certificate of 
registration with the Wildlife Resources Division, and further 
enjoining Defendant from taking any action against Plaintiff, or 
dog training groups of which Plaintiff is a member or which 
Plaintiff is affiliated with, directly or indirectly, with respect 
to dog training and/or dog trials. 
B. For money damages in the amount of $1,000.00 for 
destruction of Plaintiff's bird pens and related facilities; 
C. For money damages in the amount of $10,000.00 for 
interference with Plaintiff's contract rights; 
D. For money damages in the amount of $50,000.00 for damages 
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to Plaintiff's character and reputation; 
E. For costs of this action, including a reasonable amount 
for attorneys7 fees; and 
F. For such further and additional relief as the Court 
determines proper. 
DATED t h i s / ^ ^ day of August, 1991. 
/Parker M. Nielson 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /^^day of August, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. John P. Soltis, Assistant 
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol,J Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
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